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ABSTRACT
Libertarians assume that the sense of agency supports their belief in the agent’s ability to 
have done otherwise; however, they do not present arguments in favor of their assumption 
beyond introspection. Although agents may hold this belief, the mechanisms that give rise 
to the sense of agency—the comparator model and the perception of the relation between 
action and events in the environment—do not provide reasons to support it. Nonetheless, 
these mechanisms can help explain why agents hold the belief in the first place, and the 
investigation makes clear that the workings of the mechanisms that give rise to the sense 
of agency are compatible with determinism. Here, I will defend that a compatibilist expla-
nation can be given as to why the sense of agency may seem to support libertarian beliefs. 
Hence, the sense of agency does not support the libertarian position in the free will debate; 
it is merely the pre-reflective experience of action as self-caused, and it is associated with 
control mechanisms. 
Keywords: Sense of agency, Regulative control, Incompatibilism, Comparator model, Guid-
ance control. 
RESUMO
Libertistas supõem que a sensação de agência apoia a sua crença na habilidade do agente 
de ter agido de outro modo; contudo, não apresentam argumentos além da introspecção 
em favor dessa suposição. Embora agentes possam ter essa crença, os mecanismos dos 
quais emerge a sensação de agência—o modelo comparador e a percepção da relação 
entre a ação e eventos no ambiente—não dão razões para apoiá-la. Entretanto, esses me-
canismos podem ajudar a explicar porque agentes têm essa crença e a investigação do fun-
cionamento desses mecanismos dos quais emerge a sensação de agência deixa clara sua 
compatibilidade com o determinismo. Defenderei que uma explicação compatibilista pode 
ser dada para porque a sensação de agência parece apoiar as crenças libertistas. Portanto, 
a sensação de agência não apoia a posição libertista no debate a respeito do livre arbítrio; 
pois é meramente a experiência pré-reflexiva da ação como causada por si mesmo e está 
associada a mecanismos de controle.
Palavras-chave: Sensação de agência, Controle regulador, Incompatibilismo, Modelo com-
parador, Controle guia.
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Introduction
In the debate about free will, libertarians have traditional-
ly assumed that the agent’s ability to have done otherwise is evi-
denced by the phenomenology of agency,2 which allegedly sup-
ports their incompatibilist position. In the following, I challenge 
this assumption by elucidating the mechanisms that give rise to 
the sense of agency, the comparator model—a control mecha-
nism that relies on an efferent copy and sensory feedback—and 
the perception of the relation between act ion and events in the en-
vironment. Investigating these mechanisms casts doubt on claims 
that the sense of agency supports belief in the ability to have done 
otherwise. It seems problematic, for example, that events posterior 
to the act ion contribute to the sense of agency, as the mechanisms 
show is the case. Additional support for questioning the libertari-
an assumption is found in the hypothesis that the sense of agency 
is the pre-reflective experience of act ion as self-caused. Hence, a 
compatibilist explanation of why the sense of agency may seem to 
support libertarian beliefs is a promising alternative.
To advance the argument, in section one, I will provide 
examples of interpretations of the sense of agency that asso-
ciate it with free will. Libertarians mostly make these claims, 
but some compatibilists also endorse them. In section two, I 
briefly consider two x-phi experiments about whether people 
experience their choices as undetermined by antecedent causes 
and their conflicting results. It is noteworthy that the exper-
iments are about the experience of choice. When they claim 
that the phenomenology of agency evidences their view of free 
will, philosophers sometimes refer to the experience of choice 
and other times to the sense of agency. However, the two ex-
periences are different; therefore, they must be discussed sep-
arately. To deal with the experience of choice, I accept Deery’s 
(2015) compatibilist account of the experience of choice and of 
why people think of it as incompatible with determinism. 
In section three, to deal with claims about the sense of 
agency, I focus on explaining the mechanisms that give rise to it 
and how they do not provide evidence for the libertarian view. 
The experience might feel libertarian, but it is compatible with 
determinism. There are three main reasons why some people 
may believe that the sense of agency provides evidence of the al-
leged support: (1) they interpret the sense of agency in light of 
previous beliefs, (2) they consider only causes of which they are 
aware, and (3) it is the experience of oneself as the cause of ac-
tion. Finally, in section four, I argue that the sense of agency is as-
sociated with another kind of control, namely, guidance control. 
1. The sense of agency as 
evidence for the libertarian view
The debate about free will can be summarized by 
sketching the theoretical positions about whether we have 
free will if determinism turns out to be true. Roughly, causal 
determinism is the thesis that the current events in the world 
are caused by previous events, and that laws of nature govern 
these causal relations. Hence, events that happen are deter-
mined to happen by the laws of nature and previous events. 
Free will, on the other hand, is usually taken to mean that 
agent S did A at t while, ceteris paribus, S could have done 
other than A at t—often called the ability to have done oth-
erwise. The traditional way to divide the theoretical positions 
is by discriminating them into compatibilist and incompati-
bilist concerning determinism. Consequently, a lot hangs on 
how these positions construe determinism and free will. 
In general, compatibilists claim that, if determinism is 
true, freedom is compatible with it. The argument may in-
volve a weaker understanding of freedom that does not in-
clude the ceteris paribus clause. Contrarywise, incompatibilists 
claim that freedom is simply incompatible with the truth of 
determinism. Libertarianism is a noteworthy theoretical view 
within incompatibilism, which claims not only that free will 
is incompatible with determinism, but also that we have free 
will. Some libertarians make explicit the relevance of the phe-
nomenology of agency to their view, claiming that it has an 
incompatibilist and libertarian content; therefore, it weighs 
in favor of libertarianism.  
It is crucial to understand what the ability to have done 
otherwise requires. Fischer (1994) reframes the debate as dif-
ferent kinds of control closely related to the free will debate. 
He connects the libertarian conception of freedom, the abili-
ty to have done otherwise, to control. When an agent does A 
while having other possible courses of act ion open to her, she 
exerts regulative control. She does A, but could instead have 
done otherwise. One reason why Fischer believes that control 
is at the core of incompatibilists’ concerns about determinism 
threatening free will is the threat of factors external to the 
agent producing her act ions or forcing them in one direction. 
Much like in scenarios presented by several thought exper-
iments in which skillful neuroscientists, alien brain micro-
chips, or railroad carts in their rails force the agent into act ing 
in a particular way. In these cases, the agent would allegedly 
lack control over her act ions (Fischer, 1994).  
Fischer makes a useful distinction between regulative 
control and guidance control. Regulative control is a kind of 
control that requires alternative possibilities (Fischer, 1994, 
p. 131); i.e., for an agent to have this kind of control, every-
thing else remaining the same, the agent must have the abili-
ty to have done otherwise than she did at t. Fischer does not 
take a stand on whether we have regulative control when we 
act. Nevertheless, he believes that we exert another kind of 
control relevant to freedom when we act, namely, guidance 
control. Its compatibility with determinism is one of guidance 
control’s main charact eristics because it focuses on the actual 
sequence of events that issue the act ion, not on alternative pos-
2 The term “phenomenology of agency” is used here as an umbrella term, to encompass all experiences associated with agency, e.g., 
sense of agency, experience of choice, experience of freedom, etc.
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sibilities. Guidance control, according to Fischer, is the kind 
of control an agent has, for instance, when she is driving her 
car, decides to turn left and then turns the car left. It does not 
require that the agent could have alternatively turned right 
(more will be said about guidance control in section four). It 
is useful to think about freedom of act ion in terms of control 
because it illuminates freedom requirements.
Nida-Rümelin presents the idea that the sense of agen-
cy supports the libertarian view in terms of spontaneity, “(…) 
[t]o be phenomenally aware of doing something involves the 
experience of oneself as being act ive. In doing something we ex-
perience our own spontaneity” (Nida-Rümelin, 2007, p. 258). 
By spontaneity, I believe she means a lack of previous elements 
determining what the agent will do. Searle seems to agree:
[R]eflect very carefully on the character of 
the experiences you have as you engage in 
normal, everyday human actions. You will 
sense the possibility of alternative courses 
of action built into these experiences […] 
that we could be doing something else right 
here and now, that is, all other conditions 
remaining the same. This, I submit, is the 
source of our own unshakeable conviction 
of our own free will (Searle, 1984, p. 95).
Terry Horgan summarizes the point: “Of particular im-
portance will be the asp ect of freedom that is virtually always 
present in the experience of agency: when I experience some 
behavior as produced by me, I experience it as something that 
I could have refrained from doing” (Horgan, forthcoming). 
Therefore, Horgan agrees that the sense of agency is the ex-
perience of having at least the possibility of not having done 
what one did. Nonetheless, he does not commit to the claim 
that this is evidence that we have regulative control, for Hor-
gan defends a compatibilist position. These persp ectives take 
for granted that experiencing agency encompasses the expe-
rience of regulative control. Moreover, some take it as an en-
dorsement that agents have the said control.  
Some libertarians seem to see it in a slightly different 
way; their claims are about the experience of choosing one’s 
act ion, which seems to be different from the sense of agen-
cy. O’Connor (1995, 2009) thinks that the phenomenology 
of agency reflects agent causation, understood as the agent’s 
determination of her course of act ion among several possibil-
ities. Furthermore, he indicates that by the phenomenology 
of agency, he means the experience of forming an intention 
or choice. Moreover, Ginet testifies, “My impression at each 
moment is that I at that moment, and nothing prior to that 
moment, determine which of several open alternatives is the 
next sort of bodily exertion I voluntarily make” (1990, p. 90). 
Campbell (2002) defended that the phenomenology attests 
to human agents’ freedom of choice. The agent chose to do 
A but could have chosen to do otherwise than she did. The 
common point in all these claims is that it is considered a 
brute fact that the phenomenology of agency supports the 
libertarian view of free will, therefore dismissing the need for 
arguments to support such claims. In sections two and three, 
I investigate whether the claims are well-grounded. 
2. Indeterminist intuitions about 
the experience of choice are 
compatible with determinism
Before moving forward, it is noteworthy that some 
philosophers talk about the experience of being act ive (Ni-
da-Rümelin, 2007), of engaging in standard human act ion 
(Searle, 1984), and of experiencing behavior as produced by 
me (Horgan, forthcoming), which are descriptions that seem 
about the sense of agency. However, some talk about the pow-
er to determine which causal possibility the agent realizes 
(O’Connor, 2009), and the phenomenology of acts of decision 
(Campbell, 2002), which seems to refer to the experience of 
choice. 
Although both are part of the phenomenology of agen-
cy, they are not the same thing. Imagine I am torn about what 
to cook for a celebration next week, Italian or Thai food. I 
will consider what I cook best, what my guest likes best, what 
ingredients I already have, etc. If I make the decision days in 
advance, I may have the experience of deciding, but not the 
sense of agency—though I consider deciding a mental act ion, 
it is unclear whether agents have a sense of agency for mental 
act ions. Furthermore, when I am finally making the dish, I 
may follow the recipe, adding ingredients without deciding to 
add each ingredient. Perhaps I did not even decide to follow 
the recipe; on deciding that I would make a sp ecific dish, I 
simply put the recipe in an easy place to retrieve (usually my 
phone), because I know that I cannot make it without it. As I 
am adding the ingredients, I have a sense of agency, even if I do 
not have an experience of deciding. I believe this is not con-
troversial; I do not think the abovementioned philosophers 
hold that agents must decide to perform every intention-
al act ion. It is a different question whether act ions that the 
agent did not deliberate about and decide to do are free, but 
this is not relevant to my point. Sense of agency, on the oth-
er hand, is associated with overt intentional act ion (act ions 
that involve bodily movements) in general, independently of 
whether a decision was part of its production or not. If this is 
correct, these experiences must be dealt with differently. 
The question about why one might believe that the 
phenomenology of agency supports the libertarian view be-
comes two questions: (a) why does the experience of choice 
seem indeterminist? And (b) why does the sense of agency 
seem like the experience of regulative control? This section 
focuses on (a).
There is a dispute about whether claims associating the 
phenomenology of agency to regulative control are consis-
tent with what people claim about their experience when 
they act. It seems that it is an empirical question. Two studies 
focused on choosing a course of act ion and whether people 
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experienced they had the ability to choose otherwise. Nah-
mias and colleagues (2004) developed an x-phi experiment 
to investigate if people (non-philosophers) describe their ex-
perience of choice as involving the ability to do otherwise in 
a strictly libertarian understanding or in a compatibilist un-
derstanding of the ability to do otherwise. Roughly, the lib-
ertarian understanding requires that when the agent act ed, 
she must have been able to have done otherwise, everything 
else remaining the same, while the compatibilist claims that 
she would have done otherwise had she had reasons to do so 
(i.e., she must have had different reasons to act differently). In 
the experiment, the subjects answered questions about cases 
described in a questionnaire. The results point toward a com-
patibilist folk intuition. Conversely, a similar x-phi experiment 
by Deery, Bedke, and Nichols (2013) showed that people see 
their experience of choice as the experience of the ability to 
have chosen otherwise; additionally, they consider their expe-
rience incompatible with determinism. 
The result of each experiment contradicts the other, so 
it is hard to know what to make of them. Perhaps one design 
is more precise than the other one, making its results more 
reliable. Or perhaps intuitions are unreliable, and it is best 
to susp end judgment about them, esp ecially when they are 
contradictory. It might also be the case that the experience in 
question simply does not have a clear, robust content if it has 
any. I side with Nichols’ (2012) when he states that the phe-
nomenology of agency3 is too thin (anemic, in his terms) to 
encompass a complex content. Regulative control—the abili-
ty to have done otherwise— seems too complex a content for 
such a thin experience.     
Still, I would like to consider Deery, Bedke, and Nich-
ols’ (2013) results, wh ich support libertarian claims. Even if 
the experience of choice encompasses the ability to have cho-
sen otherwise as content, it is an open question whether this 
means that agents have this ability. Deery (2015) convincing-
ly argues that people may have the experience, but it does not 
mean that they indeed have such ability. 
Deery (2015) defends that the answer to (a)—why does 
the experience of choosing seem indeterministic—is in how 
humans experience prosp ection. Additionally, he argues that 
the experience is consistent with determinism. Simplifying 
Deery’s main point, prosp ection is mentally simulating possi-
ble futures to guide act ion. It enables agents to select a course 
of act ion among the possibilities. It does not need to be a con-
scious process, though it may be consciously experienced, af-
fectively, or even episodically. For instance, conscious affects 
have valances that allow agents to compare affective experi-
ences that accompany possible futures in order to choose a 
course of act ion. Agents experience choosing possible fu-
tures as free because of this comparison between possibili-
ties; prosp ection simulates possibilities as open for them, and 
they choose, for example, according to the affective valance of 
these possibilities. 
To explain how agents experience choice as indeter-
ministic, Deery proposes a causal model that calculates the 
outcomes of possible future courses of act ion. An event (the 
act ion) is a variable represented in the model. It can vary in 
the different ways the event might happen (the agent can per-
form different act ions), depending on the intervention (the 
agent’s decision about what to do). The decision is considered 
the ideal manipulation in the model, for it manipulates the 
whole subsequent scenario. The event that happens, how it 
happens, and the effect it springs, all depend on the decision 
about which act ion to perform. 
Interventions are ideal manipulations because they 
screen off all other possible causes of change in the effect to 
test just one variable (one way the act ion can be). The inter-
vention tweaks how the event will be and how this changes 
the consequence. Thus, the intervention isolates the causal 
connection between the event and the consequence. The 
model treats the agent’s decision as the intervention that 
makes an event happen, the act ion, and it represents the 
decision as detached from its antecedent causes, making it 
possible to focus only on possible effects. Consequently, the 
decision’s antecedent causes are ignored in the model, which 
is why agents experience their decisions as not being deter-
mined. Agents experience their choices as indeterministic 
because the causal modeling screens off the antecedent caus-
es of her decision. Nonetheless, Deery reminds us that this 
is consistent with the decision having antecedent causes, and 
with determinism; therefore, his account of the experience of 
choice is compatibilist. 
3. Sense of agency
Although the x-phi experiments discussed above do 
not aim at the sense of agency, one may suppose that it is a 
common-sense belief that the sense of agency supports that 
human agents have regulative control,4 just as some philoso-
phers believe this is the case (see section one). If this is correct, 
then it is a different matter than the experience of choice, 
and following Deery’s footsteps, it requires an answer to (b) 
why the sense of agency seems like the experience of regula-
tive control? To answer (b), it will be necessary to offer an 
account of the sense of agency and elucidate why it does not 
support belief in regulative control. Additionally, clarification 
of why it may seem to support this belief will be given. I will 
offer three possible explanations: previous beliefs influence 
the interpretation of the sense of agency, lack of awareness of 
causes, and focus on oneself as the cause of act ion instead of 
antecedent causes of act ion.  
3 Nichols alternates between talking about the experience of choice and sense of agency, which are not the same. Hence, I will use 
phenomenology of agency as an umbrella term that encompasses all agential experiences.
4 Whether common-sense indeed holds this view is, of course, an empirical question.
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3.1. Sense of agency
Although the sense of agency is an elusive experience, 
Haggard and Clark (2003) conducted a famous experiment 
that revealed an implicit maker for it, intentional binding,5
which co-occurs with the sense of agency. Intentional binding 
has since been considered an implicit marker of the sense of 
agency, for the binding suggests that the agent perceives the 
connection between her act ion and the expected sensory con-
sequences. The result showed that agents inadvertently make 
a temporal binding between their intentional act ion and its 
results in the world; this is something agents do not do when 
events are produced by something other than their intention-
al act ion. Furthermore, philosophers and cognitive scientists 
have been interest ed in the sense of agency and the conceptu-
al elements it encompasses (Marcel, 2003; de Vignemont and 
Fourneret, 2004; Synofzik et al., 2008; Pacherie, 2008; Galla-
gher, 2012).6 Although I do not discuss these elements here, I 
follow Synofzik et al. (2008) and Gallagher (2012) in making 
a phenomenological division: pre-reflective and reflective (or 
non-conceptual and conceptual). The division emphasizes that 
some of the elements associated with the phenomenology of 
agency are part of the sense of agency itself—i.e., the experi-
ence the agent has when she acts—and some are judgments the 
agent forms based on the sense of agency and previous beliefs 
about act ion, herself, and the world. 
The pre-reflective element of the phenomenology of 
agency is the sense of agency itself.7 It depends on a precon-
dition, the mechanisms that register simple covariation be-
tween movement and effects in the world through Hebbian 
learning (Synofzik et al., 2008). Even babies already display 
the investigative behavior of moving their bodies and observ-
ing the results of their movement (Synofzik et al., 2008), such 
as the movement of an object they hit. The sense of agency 
is the experience the agent has that she performed the inten-
tional act ion. It pre-reflectively allows for implicit classifica-
tion of the act ion as self-caused. 
Before moving on to the reflective elements, it is crucial 
to the present discussion to explain the mechanisms that en-
gender the sense of agency. A prominent hypothesis is that 
the sense of agency springs from the comparator model, a 
control mechanism in the production of act ion. It is a com-
parator loop, as Shepherd (2015) calls it (for a review, see 
Haggard, 2017). The comparator model is composed of an 
inverse model and a forward model (Haggard, 2017). The 
inverse model produces a motor command—act ion selec-
tion—given a motor intention, while it also creates a copy of 
the command, an efference copy. The forward model uses the 
efference copy to predict the states the system will be in when 
carrying out the command, and then it compares sensory 
feedback signals to these predictions. If these do not match, 
it produces a prediction error,8 and the agent does not feel 
she produced the act ion; she lacks the sense of agency. The 
hypothesis is that when prediction and feedback match, the 
agent has the sense of agency, the experience that she pro-
duced the act ion. 
Wen and Haggard (2020) argue, however, that the com-
parator model does not provide a full account of the sense of 
agency. Even in situations in which there is a significant pre-
diction error, experiments showed that agents could perceive 
the results of their act ions and have a sense of agency. They 
suggest that another type of computation contributes to mo-
tor performance and the sense of agency: global regularity 
perception between act ion and result. The hypothesis is that 
agents perceive that change and events in the environment 
depend on their act ions, and this allows them to experience 
the sense of agency and attribute act ions and the events that 
result from their act ions to themselves. Awareness of the con-
trol one has over the environment helps the agent investigate 
and take advantage of her environment. 
In an experiment in which a disturbance of the compar-
ator model produced a significant prediction error and mo-
tor control was weak, but the regularity between act ion and 
change in the environment was not disturbed, agents still had 
the sense of agency (Wen and Haggard, 2020). The same did 
not occur when the perception of regularity was disturbed. 
In the latter case, the sense of agency and control detection 
were diminished. The result suggests that regularity percep-
tion helps agents find out which events in the world are under 
their control. Learning what they can control is relevant be-
cause behavior aims to investigate and alter the environment, 
and it depends on the detection of statistical relations be-
tween investigative behavior and events in the environment. 
If Wen and Haggard are correct, and the perception of regu-
larity contributes to the sense of agency, it allows intentional 
behavior aimed at an objective. This kind of behavior takes 
advantage of the environment and reinforces the self-attribu-
tion of the act ion (2020, p. 104074). 
Turning to the sense of agency’s reflective elements, 
these encompass inferences and judgments the agent makes 
about her agency based on the sense of agency and her beliefs 
and inferences (Synofzik et al., 2008). An example of a judg-
ment may be the agent’s explicit attribution of her act ion to 
herself based on her beliefs about causation (even if these are 
not explicit beliefs) and her sense of agency. What has been 
called the experience of freedom, the experience of control, 
among others, may indeed be judgments of agency. Consider-
5 According to Haggard and Clark (2003), subjects tend to perceive their intentional action and its effect as closer in time than they really 
are, temporally binding the action and its effects.
6 For a dissident view, see Grünbaum (2015).
7 Synofzik et al. (2008) call it the feel of agency.
8 The prediction error can be used to adjust the movement to reach the expected state.
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ing that the sense of agency is a thin experience, it is hard to 
sp ecify its content. For this reason, it makes sense that some 
of the content attributed to it might be the contents of judg-
ments made based on the sense of agency, as well as other ele-
ments, such as previous beliefs (Synofzik et al., 2008). 
3.2. The sense of agency does not 
evidence regulative control
To investigate whether the sense of agency supports be-
lief in regulative control requires knowing what would have 
to be the case if the sense of agency did provide support for 
it. What kind of empirical evidence, if any, could sway us 
to accept the claim that agents have regulative control over 
their act ions? This issue will hardly be settled on empirical 
grounds, but empirical evidence might contribute to the dis-
cussion. Considering what can be measured in experiments at 
this time, some possibilities involve evidence about temporal 
relations, correlation, and subjective reports. 
(1)  The sense of agency should be associated with ap-
proximately the moment of onset of act ion. Con-
sider an agent who does A, but could have done 
otherwise. If the sense of agency is an indicator of 
this ability, then it should accompany the moment 
of act ion initiation, when the agent initiates A, while 
able to do otherwise.
(2)  It should arise right after a period of indetermina-
tion, i.e., a period in which what the agent will do is 
not defined yet.
(3)  If the ability to have done otherwise turns out to be 
more modest, perhaps the ability to do A or not do 
A, something like Libet’s (1985) free won’t,9 then the 
sense of agency should accompany the moment of the 
alleged possible veto; therefore, before act ion onset.
The above hypotheses do not exhaust the possibilities. 
Libertarians can present alternative proposals, but (1), (2) 
and (3) give an idea of what to expect as evidence in support 
for the libertarian view of the sense of agency. Moreover, it 
gives a glimpse of how tricky it can be to find evidence that 
the sense of agency supports belief in regulative control be-
yond introsp ection. Nevertheless, what we know about the 
sense of agency does not fit with possibilities (1), (2), or (3).
The sense of agency is not associated with the moment 
of act ion onset, contrary to hypothesis (1). The comparator 
model involves a temporally extended process that initiates 
with act ion selection and goes on while sensory feedback is 
still being received. If Wen and Haggard (2020) are correct, 
hypothesis (2) does not hold either. The sense of agency does 
not necessarily arise after a period of indetermination; it 
arises after the fulfillment of determined expectations. The 
experiment showed that, independently of the comparator 
model, the perceived relation between act ion and its results 
contributes to the sense of agency, and learning the regulari-
ty between act ion and outcome enables agents to investigate 
and modify their environments. Hence, agents expect a regu-
larity between act ions and outcomes in the environment, and 
the perception of the expected regularity contributes to the 
sense of agency, not indetermination. 
Finally, it is not relevant for (3) to enter the debate about 
whether Libet’s veto proposal is plausible or possible. For the 
sake of argument, I will concede that it is. If this is the case, and 
the sense of agency was the experience of the ability to veto 
or not veto the production of act ion, then it should arise be-
fore act ion onset, when the veto is allegedly possible. At most, 
it should arise until the onset of act ion because it might be too 
late to veto the act ion after that, or at least to veto it entirely. 
However, the sense of agency does not arise before the onset of 
act ion (even accepting some delay in the experience). 
3.3. Why the sense of agency may 
seem to support libertarianism: three 
possibilities
Considering that the sense of agency is a faint experi-
ence and that it is not clear that there is any empirical ev-
idence to support claims about its association with regula-
tive control, one may wonder why philosophers make these 
claims. There might be more than one explanation, but there 
are at least three possibilities: (i) agents might interpret their 
experience in light of their background beliefs or theoretical 
commitments; (ii) agents might consider only the elements 
of which they are aware when they think about how they 
brought about their act ion; (iii) the focus might be on oneself 
having caused the act ion instead of on antecedent causes. 
Nichols (2012), Pereboom (2015), and Synofzik et al. 
(2008) defend a version of (i). As seen above, Nichols defends 
that the sense of agency is too anemic to encompass a com-
plex representation, such as indeterminism—for the agent to 
have regulative control, she must not have been determined 
to act. Synofzik and colleagues (2008) defend that previous 
beliefs can compose the reflective elements of the phenome-
nology of agency because the agent’s beliefs influence how she 
interprets her sense of agency. If it is the common-sense view 
that agents have free will and that free will requires some-
thing like regulative control, agents may interpret their sense 
of agency in light of that belief. They might interpret the ane-
mic sense of agency as indeterministic, if that means it was 
not determined that one would do A, resulting in the belief 
9 Roughly, in the famous experiment, Libet found that brain activity associated with the preparation of action, the readiness potential, 
arises approximately 350 ms before subjects become conscious of their intention to act in spontaneous voluntary action. Nevertheless, 
after becoming conscious of their intention, subjects allegedly could consciously veto the action before its onset.
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that the sense of agency supports that agents have regulative 
control over the act ion.  
Pereboom (2015) argues that the sense of agency itself does 
not represent any ability, such as the ability to do otherwise. Nev-
ertheless, previous beliefs can influence how one interprets one’s 
sense of agency, for instance, belief in free will. He calls this an 
impure phenomenology. The proposal corroborates Synofzik and 
colleagues’ (2008) view. If this is correct, the phenomenology of 
agency unduly contributes to the belief that one has regulative 
control over one’s act ions if one already believes that agents have 
regulative control, or at least that they ordinarily seem to have it. 
Nevertheless, the sense of agency itself does not ground such a 
claim; one’s previous beliefs give rise to it.
Explanation (ii) is also not new; Pereboom reminds 
us that Spinoza already argued along the lines that when 
explaining our actions, we take into account only causes 
we are aware of or know. This means that if our actions 
are caused by mechanisms we are unaware of, we will not 
count them in our explanation of action, and we will claim 
that our actions are uncaused. The conclusion, however, 
would be mistaken.
In the case of the sense of agency, agents do not usu-
ally attend to their previous mental states (beliefs, desires, 
intentions), although they are able to introspect if they 
wish. Still, an agent will not be able to establish a regu-
larity between her mental states and her action to claim 
that there is a causal relation between them. The causal 
relation between one’s mental states (or the neural causes 
of action) and action is not something agents can experi-
ence. Therefore, when one acts, one does not experience 
the causal antecedents of the action, she only has the sense 
of agency, which is why the agent does not take notice of 
the antecedent causes of her action, allowing her to expe-
rience agency as indeterministic, in the sense that there is 
no salient antecedent cause of her action. Nonetheless, the 
abovementioned scenario is compatible with actions hav-
ing antecedent causes and even with being determined by 
them. Therefore, one cannot claim that the sense of agen-
cy provides good reasons to believe in regulative control 
because there is nothing about the sense of agency itself 
that provides evidence that agents have such control.
If the sense of agency is not the experience of regu-
lative control, then answering what it might be is crucial. 
The answer will make room for (iii), another compatibilist 
explanation of why the sense of agency is seen as support-
ive of belief in regulative control. The sense of agency is 
a pre-reflective experience of action as self-caused, i.e., 
caused by oneself, in opposition to an event that happens 
(de Vignemont and Fourneret, 2004; Synofzik et al., 2008; 
Haggard, 2017). Synofzik et al. (2008) call the sense of 
agency a feeling, to emphasize that it is a pre-reflective ex-
perience, and they accept that it works as a classification of 
the action as self-caused, and claim that it springs from a 
stable encoding of action as self-caused, i.e., caused by one-
self. It is the experience of “on line control” (de Vignemont 
and Fourneret, 2004, p. 12), meaning that the agent identi-
fies as the cause of the action, in the way it was achieved—
as she intended.
A more modest interpretation of what libertarians say 
about the sense of agency fits this hypothesis. In the claim 
that act ions feel spontaneous (Nida-Rümelin, 2007), perhaps 
the experience in question can be construed as the experience 
of the source of act ion. The sense of agency can be thought of 
as (or at least encompassing) an experience of source of act ion 
(Bayne and Levi, 2006; Horgan, 2003). 
Experiencing oneself as the source of the act ion makes 
the agent’s role in the production of the act ion salient, and 
it might lead one to think of oneself as the uncaused causer 
of the act ion because what one does has a particular experi-
ence to it, different from when others act, or from when an 
event simply happens (Haggard and Clark, 2003). Further-
more, considering that sense of agency classifies act ions as 
self-caused, the agent feels she causes things to happen, but 
there is no such experiential marker for her mental states 
or neural act ivity that contribute to the production of the 
act ion; she feels she causes the act ion, but not that she is 
caused to act. The classification as self-caused goes beyond 
the agent not being aware of previous causes because the 
sense of agency makes salient the agent’s role in causing ac-
tion. Consequently, she might interpret that no antecedent 
cause contributed to the production of the act ion and that 
she caused the act ion. Nonetheless, the experience does not 
necessarily make it true that one is the uncaused causer of 
the act ion; for instance, the sense of agency has causes itself, 
they just are not experienced by the agent. 
Although the agent’s experience is compatible with be-
lief in regulative control, it cannot work as evidence for it. It 
may seem like antecedent causes did not determine the act ion 
or the sense of agency; however, the experience says nothing 
about causal antecedents. It just seems this way because it car-
ries no information about how the agent caused it or whether 
it had an antecedent cause. The sense of agency does not offer 
information that denies the existence of antecedent causes; it 
simply does not offer information about antecedent causes at 
all, while emphasizing the agent’s causal role.
4. Sense of agency is associated 
with guidance control
Now that it is clear that it is mistaken to claim that 
the sense of agency supports regulative control, if the sense 
of agency is associated with control, it is more reasonable 
to associate it with guidance control. Guidance control in-
volves criteria related to the agent’s reasons to act (Fischer, 
1994, 2012): (1) The agent must be able to recognize rea-
sons to act (especially moral reasons) and act in response 
to such reasons (2012, p. 11); additionally, (2) the mech-
anism that issues the action must be the agent’s own. I 
will not focus on requirement (1), but on (2), going from 
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settling on a course of action to fine motor movement in-
volves processes that guaranty control, and as seen above, 
the sense of agency springs from these.10 I will not take up 
the task of spelling out detailed mechanisms here, but El-
len Fridland (2014) and Joshua Shepherd’s (2015) theories 
about control help us have an idea of what processes might 
take place in terms of control from when the agent selects 
a course of action to motor movement.11 The comparator 
model associated with the sense of agency is part of these 
control processes; thus, it is a reason to associate the expe-
rience with guidance control.
Fridland (2014) suggests that because of pract ice, agents 
develop (a) strategic control, (b) selective, top-down, atten-
tion control, and (c) motor control.12 According to this theo-
ry, each level of control13 cascades into the next, showing how 
pract icing act ion does not eliminate the need for conscious 
control, and how the agent’s intentions and mental states can 
influence motor control when performing skilled act ion.14
Additionally, Shepherd (2015) points out the impor-
tance of implementation and executive asp ects of act ion 
control. Implementation refers to, literally, the systems’ im-
plementation of the steps necessary to achieve a particular 
goal, i.e., the process of producing states of affairs that satisfy 
the system’s goal. Execution refers to planning, filling in the 
plan, plan monitoring, and revision of the necessary steps 
to achieve the particular goal in overt intentional act ions. 
Shepherd also admits that there are higher and lower levels 
of act ion control, which is compatible with Fridland’s theory. 
Following what has been said about the sense of agency, Shep-
herd defends that control mechanisms are comparator loops 
that use prediction and feedback (predictive or sensory),15
which is how executive and implementation asp ects articu-
late and enable act ion control at each level of control. The 
comparator model fits the proposal, showing how the sense of 
agency arises from the control mechanism involved in what 
can be associated with guidance control.
After the agent has settled on a course of act ion, the pro-
duction of the act ion involves steps that go from the intention 
to A to moving one’s muscles to act in a way that will satisfy 
the relevant intention. Control mechanisms come into place 
in different levels of control, and if the act ion goes as expected 
(if the feedback signals match the predictions) or the agent 
perceives the relation between act ion and intended results, 
the agent has the experience that it was self-caused, i.e., the 
sense of agency. If this is correct, the sense of agency may 
support belief in guidance control. The agent has the sense of 
agency when she acts as intended through her own mecha-
nisms,16 which is a relevant part of guidance control. 
Conclusion
Libertarians have assumed that the ability to have done 
otherwise—regulative control—is evidenced in the phenom-
enology of agency. Considering that they make claims about 
the experience of choice and the sense of agency, I accept 
Deery’s (2015) defense of a compatibilist explanation of the 
experience of choice, and I set out to provide a compatibilist 
account of the sense of agency. For starters, the explanation 
of the mechanisms that give rise to the sense of agency en-
10 There is an epistemic side to guidance control that requires that the agent recognize her reasons to act. Additionally, acting in re-
sponse to reasons means selecting an action course in accordance with those reasons and acting on it. The sense of agency does not 
seem to be associated to all these requirements, especially the epistemic requirement, but it springs from the mechanisms that issue 
action—mechanism, according to Fischer (2012), should be understood as process—, specifically from control mechanisms, which show 
that it can be associated with guidance control.
11 Fischer focuses also on recognizing the reasons to act and selecting a course of action according to such reasons. Here, I am not 
concerned with these parts of the process, because my focus is on the sense of agency.
12 Strategic control “ought to be identified with the goals, plans, and strategies that the agent uses in order to guide various instantia-
tions of motor skill” (Fridland, 2014, p. 2744). Though it does not have to be conscious, it is crucially associated with agential control, 
and it does not automatize. Selective, top-down, attention selects the environment’s features relevant to the action the agent intends to 
perform, including features of the environment to which the agent needs to respond to act. Fridland specifies that this becomes auto-
mated in skilled action, but it is still sensitive to the contents of the agent’s intentional states, “[…] learning to attend to the right things 
at the right times” (Fridland, 2014 p. 2746). Motor control “is constituted by the automatized motor routines that are learned through 
practice and training” (Fridland, 2014, p. 2748); still, it is cognitively penetrable through practice and attention.
13 Christensen et al. (2016) agree with Fridland in the separation of levels of control. They propose a very similar distinction between 
levels. There are also close similarities to Pacherie’s (2008) account of control (see Christensen et al., 2016 for a comparison between 
their proposal and the latter).
14 Fridland’s proposal is concerned with skilled action, but considering that action control comes in degrees, skilled action being at the far 
end of the spectrum, Fridland’s theory can be applied with qualification according to the degree of skill: novice, moderate, confident, and 
skilled. Roughly, the difference between these levels is how automatized the motor routines are, as well as selective attention, which does 
not mean that skilled action is fully automatic or even that the motor routines are cognitively impenetrable. If one accepts that control 
comes in degrees, then it is easy to see that an agent A may have rudimentary selective attention when performing an action, while a skilled 
agent may have impeccable selective, top-down, automatic attention. This kind of automation may also occur in routine intentional actions 
that most people would not call skilled.
15 Shepherd’s view is, in this sense, similar to Pacherie’s (2008) proposal that control of action depends on a series of comparators.
16 Of course, there are cases in which this can go array. Wegner (2003) presents cases in which the agent has the sense of agency without 
having performed the action, or vice-versa. Some of these cases are explained by confounding visual cues, for instance, confirming the 
relevance of the perception of the relation between action and its consequences.
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ables seeing that these mechanisms do not work in a way 
that supports claims about regulative control. Moreover, at 
least three compatibilist explanations are possible for why 
the sense of agency may seem to support the belief in regula-
tive control. Agents interpret their sense of agency in light of 
previous beliefs, agents do not have the experience of the an-
tecedent causes of their act ion and remain unaware of these, 
and agents have the experience of act ion as self-caused (the 
sense of agency) but not of being caused to act by antecedent 
causes. Hence, even if it does not feel that way, the sense of 
agency is compatible with determinism. Finally, the sense of 
agency can be associated with the mechanisms that fulfill the 
requirements for guidance control. 
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